PUBLIC DISCOURSE ON EUTHANASIA: DILEMMAS AND UNCERTAINTIES
Even when these standards have been met, public discourse about euthanasia may still create dilemmas and uncertainties. Public debates carried on too long can become highly repetitive, confusing, and debilitating. Some may sense that everyone could benefit from a pause for thought, from a period of respite to let the waves of debate damper down. Yet if public statements continue to stream forth, statements some judge to be wrongheaded and dangerous, such a matter -can bring us all right up and onto the edge between complexity and chaos. That is why the old physician's principle, "give others a chance to talk", cannot stand alone. There is also the principle of challenge and response. The freedom and the opportunity to speak publicly on matters of high importance to an entire society requires the availability of others who will rise to challenge and criticize views that may be biased, expressive of too narrow a range of experience, or simply erroneous. Then, in tum, the challengers themselves should be exposed to challenge.
The Journal of Palliative Care, and others like it, exist as forums within which the mutually critical and corrective interaction of opposing views can occur. Moreover, the freedom to speak publicly on matters of high importance is constrained by the balancing responsibility to honor the standards of public discourse such as the standards of clarity and. precision, of evidence-based statements, of distinguishing personal opinion from knowledge, of restraint in generalization, of civility in debate. The peer-review process is one of the more reliable procedures for helping those who aspire to participate in public discourse to come up to these standards and to screen out presentations that fall far too short of the excellence required for that participation. Closed societies suppress public discussion of matters considered dangerous by those with the POwer to refuse an imprimatur. Social, political, and moral stability, it is thought, can be thereby secured, at least for awhile. Life in an open society can be much more uncertain. In such societies people are generally free to say and write what they want, and there is power in the spoken and written word. Skillfully expressed ideas about how the world should be changed, be it the world of medicine and the care of the dying or be it the Wider world of social movements, can and do change the ways people think, and live, and act.
. Discourse in open societies about matters of life and death -and euthanasia discourse is Like most simple principles, the physician's "give others a chance to talk" can be quite exacting, particularly when these others want to say publicly what some other people do not want to . hear said at all. So it was with the article of Drs.
STANDARDS OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE
Billings and Block. I was advised, you see, and quite outside the peer-review process, not to publish this article in the Journal, with or without commentaries. This pre-publication scuffle has given me reason to reflect, even if ever so briefly in this editorial, not directly on the ethics of euthanasia, but rather on the ethics and the logic of euthanasia discourse in an open society.
• is there not a continuing responsibility to speak out, to clarify matters, even to denounce other views if necessary? But is there not then a danger that a .long-lasting, acrimonious, and often confusing course of public debate, on euthanasia in this instance, can spiral out into a verbal space that is quite virtual, quite out of touch with the space where people suffer and die? Is it responsible to continue participating in a public debate if and when that debate is becoming more important to itself and to its participants than the realities with which it is putatively concerned? But how can one reliably ascertain if and when public discourse on any matter of great importance has strayed away from the public purpose only to become an end unto itself?
The sense of a need for public silence on euthanasia may also have another motivation. The stakes in this debate are really quite high, and the divisions of fundamental belief are quite profound, and who wants to fail in their defence either of life or liberty? Public discourse in an open society about matters of life and death, matters that call forth profound and conflicting beliefs, can be very demanding and possibly perilous. What if those advocating what I consider to be disastrously wrong are so much better than I and my co-thinkers in writing, arguing, and persuading? How high the levels of anxiety must be for those who may find themselves in the predicament of believing they possess the truth and of suspecting they are not intellectually or rhetorically up to its adequate defence.
And then there is the possibility of something like guilt by association. It is fair to say that many who work in palliative care do not want people to associate palliative care with euthanasia. But will that association not be reinforced if leaders in palliative care are constantly out in the public forum speaking about, even if against, euthanasia? But then again, would silence on the subject not be an even stronger reinforcement of the association?
Those who may be almost as preoccupied over public discussion about euthanasia as they are about euthanasia itself might consider the link between Karl Popper's reflection on Plato and his advice about the requirements of living in an open society (1) . The funeral oration of Pericles is one of Antiquity'S clearest and most powerful descriptions of life in an open society. A central idea in that oration is that public discussion is not a stumbling block but an indispensable preliminary to acting wisely.
Plato was deeply impressed by that creed in the oration of Pericles but at the same time saw the breakdown of a closed society as the source of the evils of insecurity, uncertainty, and aimless drifting of people away from clear and defined standards of how to live a human life. If Popper's interpretation of Plato is correct, Plato's choice of adherence to the closed society and to its securities and certainties led him to adopt the very methods of tyranny that he had once hated and denounced. Plato illustrates the lesson that it is impossible to maintain the standards of civilization and the ethics of humanity if we refuse to bear what Popper calls the cross of humaneness, the cross of reason and responsibility.
Popper's advice is about a fundamental choice, a choice inherent to the human condition. We can opt for a closed society with its certainties and securities, but we then risk finding ourselves entrapped in the ethics of tyranny.
Opting for an open society quite certainly means moving out into the unknown and facing up to its uncertainties and insecurities. The enduring task in such a society is to use "what reason we have to plan as well as we can for both security and freedom" (2) .
THE LOGIC OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE ON EUTHANASIA
The use of reason, whether it be in planning for security and freedom, whether it be in defending life and liberty, has its own laws of operation, its own logic. That logic works in quite different ways upon the many diverse but related matters implicated in any public discourse on euthanasia.
That discourse inevitably turns around matters of fact. Do the dying request euthanasia? Quite frequently or only rarely? Does the prevalence of euthanasia requests vary across different types of disease? Do doctors practice euthanasia? How often? Overtly or clandestinely? These questions, and many others, are questions about matters of fact. Such questions cannot be answered by arguments, speculation, imaginings, or the recounting of stories heard here and there. One cannot reliably extrapolate from individual stories to reach valid generalizations about the extent of a practice such as euthanasia. Only sound studies can produce the cumulative data needed to answer questions about matters of fact.
Debates about euthanasia are particularly difficult when people use the same term or terms and actually mean quite .different things. Clarification of questions about matters of meaning advances slowly, if at all, when definitions are constructed more for the purposes of advocacy, for the purpose of persuading or convincing others, than for the purpose of clearing up confusion and assuring that the many parties in the discussion are really talking about the same things.
The making of distinctions, for example, between concepts and acts that are different one from another, is logic's strategy to answer questions about matters of meaning. Collapsing distinctions that reflect real differences between concepts or acts is a rhetorical device designed to serve the purposes of manipulation rather than those of reasoned argument.
During the last century, waves of public dis-Course about euthanasia have periodically rolled over the societies of the West. The medical, social, economic, and political components of these public euthanasia controversies have never been quite the same in any given historical period, but profound conflicts of belief have rarely, if ever, been absent from the discussions.
Euthanasia discourse is thus also about matters of belief, in part because fundamental beliefs, usually dormant in the routine of everyday life, are particularly apt to be awakened and activated by words and acts that touch upon values of high human importance. Euthanasia is such an act. Diverse worldview beliefs cluster, for instance, around the requirements of respect for human dignity; around the ethical and legal implications of the sacredness of human life; about the range of dominion people should be acknowledged to have over their own lives; about the extent of a physician's mandate in the care of the dying; about the role of law in an open society. These beliefs cannot easily be changed or shaken by accumulations of data, facts, or information, because they are the field, the lighted space, or the horizori within which data, facts, and information are interpreted and acquire their meaning and value.
Reason's logic would direct us to recognize and respect the difference between matters about which we may productively argue in an open society and matters about which we must make basic and personal choices. Controversies involving contradictory fundamental beliefs can rarely be resolved, particularly if resolution means attainment of a compromise or policy with which everyone can agree. The most that often can be achieved in such profound controversies is a political accommodation, moderately tolerable to most, that maintains the coherence of a society, protects the civil process of public discourse, fosters respect for personal conscience, and refuses to tolerate the subjection of moral minorities on any issue to discrimination, harassment, or ridicule (3) .
Within the context of such an accommodation, if it can be attained, people advocating the most contradictory positions on euthanasia may come to the point of listening attentively to one another's diverse experiences. When that happens, one may even be graced with the discovery that one can be enriched and enlightened precisely by those with whom one disagrees most profoundly.
